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Part 1: From Rebel to Revolution? Formal Democracy and its Grievances 
Dr Vivienne Matthies-Boon and Dr Brecht de Smet 
Reform versus Revolution 
There are many ways to interpret the 30 June protests and Morsi’s exit.  However, the Western 
media and commentaries have generally taken the formal democratic approach.  According to 
this perspective, president Morsi was democratically elected and thus the legitimate president of 
Egypt.  The recent intervention of the Egyptian Armed Forces was accordingly interpreted as a 
military coup against a legitimate government. 
That the mainstream outlets in the West – such as the BBC, CNN, New York Times, etc. – have 
adopted this approach did not come as a surprise. From the revolution’s very beginning in 
January 2011, Western diplomats were keen to reduce the demands of the Egyptian revolution 
to a call for formal democracy. This push for the implementation of formal democratic 
procedures was part of the ‘Orderly Transition’ paradigm. This paradigm was  espoused by the 
United States as soon as they finally realized they could no longer hang onto their old 
strongman, Hosni Mubarak, during the last days of the 2011 revolutioni.  This paradigm basically 
insisted on a top-down political reform in contrast to a bottom-up overthrow of dominant 
political and economic institutions and practices, in order to deflect the demands of the 
revolutionary movement. Street politics and the emergence of grassroots democratic structures 
were to be contained by the ballot box.  As long as free and fair elections were held, the spectre 
of authoritarianism could be exorcised.  
The problems with this formal democratic approach became evident when Egyptians were 
forced to choose between the lesser of two evils, Mohammed Morsi (the Muslim Brotherhood 
candidate) and Ahmed Shafiq (who represented the old NDP regime) in the second round of the 
presidential elections. Whilst the more progressive revolutionary forces had attained a greater 
share of the vote in the first round of elections, this vote was split between three different 
candidates (Hamdeen Sabahi, Khalid Ali and Abdel Moneim Abd El-Fotouh). Unwilling to put 
their eggs in an ex-NDP basket, Morsi won with a small margin of the vote (though there are 
allegations that Shafiq had in fact won the elections). This strengthened the sense among many 
Egyptians that although the presidential elections were ‘procedurally correct’, formal democracy 
did not necessarily represent the will of the people – and certainly not the will of the revolution.   
By discursively reducing the demands of the Egyptian revolution to a call for electoral 
democracy, Western spokesmen and domestic elites ensured that more substantive reforms – 
such as an overhaul of the entire socio-economic system – were dropped by the wayside. By 
focusing only on the second element of the revolutionary demand for “bread, freedom and social 
justice”, they turned a blind eye to the profound systemic socio-economic injustices that 
underpinned the mass uprisings not only in Egypt but across the region. These injustices are 
persistently stimulated and aggravated by the neoliberal economic order and international 
financial institutions – such as the IMF and World Bank.  Framing the “Arab Spring” merely in 
terms of a formal democratic “transition” allowed for a continuation of neoliberal reform in 
Egypt (which previously underpinned Mubarak’s crony capitalism in Egypt). Despite evidence to 
the contrary,  economic liberalization was presumed to coincide with political liberalization. 
  
The Brotherhood’s Democracy 
This narrative of democratic transition suited the Muslim Brotherhood particularly well.  They 
insisted that their “Islamic” project represented a culturally authentic model of governance vis-
à-vis “Western” political and economic practices. Nevertheless, close analysis reveals that their 
economic model resembles that of other (Western) neoliberal vanguards such as David 
Cameron. Like Cameron’s ‘big society’, the economic model proposed and pursued by the 
leadership of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is that of neoliberal reform (i.e. privatization, 
the selling off of public assets, the support of big business tycoons, etc.) with some charity 
thrown in. The problem with this modern charity discourse – framed within traditional Islamic 
terms – is that it fits the neoliberal economic model perfectly, since it literally privatizes both the 
cause and solution of poverty and inequity, by reducing structural societal problems of 
redistribution and ownership to a question of individual morality.  
Moreover, the democratic transition paradigm, which elevates elections as the only measure of 
revolutionary legitimacy, allowed the Brotherhood to defend its political position in the eyes of 
the international community, even in the face of mass protests against its rule. However, this 
perspective does not take into account the deep dissatisfaction across large sections of the 
Egyptian population with Morsi’s rule. This dissatisfaction resulted from what many saw as the 
Brotherhoodisation of the state, the increase of violence and torture, the deterioration of living 
standards and unjust social and political policies.   
Many argued that from its very inception, Morsi’s government was not a government for the 
Egyptian people but merely for those belonging to the Brotherhood.  Morsi sought to Islamise 
Egypt’s main political institutions such as the Judiciary and Ministries – through the imposition 
of those loyal to the Brotherhood. Evidence for this includes the November 2012 Presidential 
decree wherein Morsi sought to unit all branches of government under his control (and which 
resulted in the Palace clashes in December 2012), the rushed and highly controversial 
constitution written by an all-Islamist assembly, as well as most recently the ousting of the 
Culture Minister and the ‘cleansing’ of Egypt’s cultural activities. Moreover, under the pretext of 
fighting ‘feloulist’ forces of the old regime, Morsi ‘safeguarded’ the revolution by ousting all 
those critical of his government and dragging critical media personalities (including Bassem 
Youssef) in front of the courts on charges of ‘insulting the president’. In addition, the Muslim 
Brotherhood and Morsi supporters drove buses full of their supporters to sites where anti-
government protesters were gathering (such as Itihediya palace in December and Moqattam in 
March), thereby guaranteeing bloody conflicts. Recently they also incited direct violence against 
the Shia minority in Egypt, resulting in four deadii. They increasingly polarised the country by 
insisting that all those not loyal to the president were not proper Muslims.  Moreover, even 
when the army insisted on its ultimatum, they made no significant steps towards reconciliation, 
and instead spoke about the need to sacrifice one’s blood for the legitimacy of the president.   
Tamarrod and the Army 
The deep dissatisfaction with Morsi culminated in more than 22 million signatures during the 
Tamarrod (Rebel) campaign, which demanded the removal of the president, the establishment 
of an interim government, the rewriting of the constitution and early presidential elections. The 
military estimated that on 30 June 2013, over 30 million Egyptians took to the streets to make 
these demands heard. Though the exact number of protesters is disputed, their quantity 
certainly outnumbered the votes Morsi had received in the second round of the presidential 
election ( 13,230,131).  For those who were protesting against Morsi, this signified that Morsi no 
longer represented the Egyptian people and had lost all legitimacy.   
The army stuck to its ultimatum and intervened, after it had come to some understanding with 
the anti-Morsi movement, as we now know.iii  So far, it appears to have stood by the demands of 
the Tamarrod campaign:  it immediately installed an interim president (Adli Mansour – the Head 
of the Constitutional Court).  It is also insisting on a inclusive approach through which early 
presidential and parliamentary elections are held.  Thus, from the anti-Morsi’s protesters 
perspective, the intervention of the army entailed an end to: 1) encroaching Islamisation, 2) a 
new authoritarianism in Islamist guise; and 3) gross economic mismanagement.   
Military spokesmen, such as Colonel Ahmed Ali have furthermore argued that – because of the 
reluctance of the Brotherhood to give in to the demands of the protesters and the readiness of 
Ikhwan members to pledge their blood to defend the president – the military intervention 
constituted a humanitarian solution. It prevented a further escalation of street violence and 
perhaps even a civil war. 
Given the grievances outlined above and the mass character of the anti-Morsi movement, it is 
not surprising that many Egyptians feel angered by the fact that the Western media not only 
largely remained silent on the past abuses of power by Morsi but now even depicts Morsi as a 
legitimate president who has been illegitimately overthrown by a military coup.  They insist that 
the military intervention was not a coup, but rather constituted the crowning achievement of a 
“second revolution” that represented the will of the people.    
  
PART 2: From Rebel to Revolution? On the Alliance between the Muslim Brotherhood and 
the Military 
In the previous part of this article, we outlined a critique of the formal democratic paradigm that 
not only underpinned the international responses to Egypts revolution from its very inception, 
but also largely formed the backbone to president Morsi’s claimed legitimacy.  Given the deep 
political, social and economic grievances in Egypt as well as problems within this paradigm 
itself, it is not surprising that many Egyptians have argued that president Morsi has lost all 
legitimacy. It is hence also understandable that many Egyptians are angered by the Western 
media coverage, which largely holds onto this formal democratic and simplistically depicts the 
current events as the ousting of a democratic and legitimate president by a military coup. 
However, we should be careful to note that this critique of the formal democratic paradigm does 
not imply a straightforward fiat for military intervention.  In order to transcend the conceptual 
dichotomy between “revolutionary coup” and “democratic legitimacy”, one should carefully 
analyse the motivations and positions of the different factions involved in the process.  One 
should particularly note the silent alliance between the MB and army, and how this has been 
interrupted by the Tamarrod campaign and the recent street protests. 
Since January 2011, the simple discursive contradistinction between “the people” and the 
“dictator” has been complicated by the fragmentation and crystallization of different 
revolutionary and counter-revolutionary actors. The popular uprising of 25 January disorganised 
the ruling bloc, but it did not overthrow it. The military intervention of the SCAF that forced 
Mubarak to resign and brought forth a “transitional” regime represented itself as the realization 
of popular power, while, in reality, it merely replaced popular mobilization from below by its 
own top-down rearrangement of elite forces. Gamal Mubarak and his cronies were kicked out 
the ruling coalition and the patrimonial networks of the NDP and the power of the Interior 
Ministry were weakened in relation to the Armed Forces. 
From the March 2011 referendum onwards, the SCAF found a strong but unruly ally in the 
Brotherhood and the Salafist movement to impose its formal democratic roadmap on the 
revolution. The torture and intimidation of political activists, especially women, the failure to 
democratise authoritarian institutions such as the Ministry of Interior and the army itself, the 
inability to secure economic prosperity and social justice, stimulated new protests against the 
military-engineered transition. The Brotherhood, for its part, tried to capitalise on the increased 
discontent with SCAF rule to strengthen its own position vis-à-vis the generals and the other 
remnants of the old regime.   
While the Brotherhood was unable and unwilling to confront these institutions of power, it could 
negotiate a compromise in which the old guard of the SCAF retired, Thus, Hussein Tantawi (the 
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces the Minister of Defense under Mubarak since 1991) 
and Sami Anan (Chief of Staff since 2005) were pushed to the sidelines of the political game in 
return for immunity from prosecution. This spectacle was engineered with a great deal of 
fanfare, which boosted Morsi’s image as a pro-revolutionary civilian president who “sent the 
army back to the barracks”, thereby completing one of the goals of the revolution. Morsi also 
promoted more ‘likeable’ military officers such as Abdul-Fattah al-Sisi to the position of Defense 
Minister and Chief of Staff of the Armed forces.    
However, as Gilbert Achcar points out in his new book The People Want,iv the “revolutionary 
nature” of these retirements and appointments was grossly overstated both within and beyond 
the Brotherhood.  For Tantawi and Annan had long passed their retirement age and were 
severely disliked within the military forces anyway. Furthermore, Al Sisi was not as pro-
revolutionary as generally claimed: in June 2011, he even publicly justified the virginity tests on 
17 female demonstratorsv. In fact, Sisi was forced to retract his statement by SCAF itself, as they 
were such an embarrassment to them in light of international condemnation. 
Nevertheless, there was a temporary division of labour emerging between the Brotherhood and 
the generals, whereby the Brotherhood safeguarded the economic and political interests of the 
military apparatus, in exchange for the right to govern. The December 2012 constitution 
articulated this compromise, as it continued to shield the military’s budget from parliamentary 
control.Ironically, for the Brotherhood rank-and-file, as well as the revolutionary opposition, this 
alliance with the military remained a closed book.  Instead, the Muslim Brotherhood increasingly 
depicted itself as engaged in a ‘revolutionary’ battle to cleanse the feloulist elements both within 
state institutions as well as within revolutionary forces, thereby constructing a revolutionary 
legitimacy of their own. Yet, one could say that this ‘revolutionary’ battle was compromised 
when they grew increasingly sympathetic to corrupt businessmen affiliated to the previous 
regime. Even feloulist  capitalists such as Hussein Salem, who was slapped with a 15 year jail 
sentence in absentia for illegally acquiring public property and was responsible for the illegal 
gas deals with Israel, was offered a reconciliatory deal. And more generally, businessmen closely 
associated to the NDP were asked to return to Egypt in order to improve Egypt’s business 
climate.  
The rise of Tamarrod and the inability of the Ikhwan to contain the movement, alienated the 
generals from their erstwhile partners. As the Brothers proved incapable of securing political 
and economic stability, the military apparatus opened negotiations with Tamarrod and the 
political opposition parties, especially the National Salvation Front. As such, the stand-off 
between the Armed Forces and the Brotherhood was expressed by a split in the revolutionary 
movement itself. In the eyes of the anti-Morsi protesters, the Brotherhood had hijacked and 
betrayed the revolution. The army was conceived of as an instrument of popular power to get rid 
of the Ikhwan and revive the revolutionary process. In the eyes of the pro-Morsi demonstrators, 
Tamarrod paved the way for the return of the military and the feloul to power – thus it 
constituted a counter-revolutionary force. The fight between the Brotherhood leadership and 
the generals over state power was articulated within the revolutionary movement, splitting it 
along sectarian lines, with protesters in each camp genuinely believing they represented the 
revolution. 
The Revolution Continued 
Even though Tamarrod underestimated the impact of the military intervention on the political 
relations of force, it would be wrong to consider the whole process as merely a top-down coup. 
The magnificent movement represented a new high point in the revolutionary process that 
started since 2011, re-politicising broad layers of the populace, and re-constituting grassroots 
instruments of popular power. Despite the presence of feloul and opportunist political figures in 
the ranks of the campaign, its spontaneous mobilisation and organisation represented the 
revolutionary aspirations that once had driven the 25 January uprising. The military was forced 
to intervene because of this mass uprising and could only control it by seemingly allying itself 
with the movement. Conversely, although many of the Ikhwan members and sympathisers had 
at one point resisted authoritarianism and crony capitalism side-by-side with secular liberals, 
nationalists, and leftists, now they were found defending an authoritarian president, who had 
allied himself on multiple occasions with the same elite faction (the army and corrupt 
businessmen) that they loathed. Unlike the Tamarrod activists, who had swept the military into 
action, the Brotherhood rank-and-file was driven into the streets by their reactionary 
leadership, which struggled for the survival of its narrow interests. 
Right now, in order to enact the revolutionary demands of bread, freedom and social justice, the 
movement has to overcome three obstacles. Firstly, revolutionaries should be wary of the novel 
“democratic transition” from above. Without any profound transformation of core state 
institutions such as the army and the security forces, elections, parliament, the presidency, and 
the constitution, will remain exercises in formal democracy. The on-going top-down transition 
should therefore be supervised by the building and expansion of bottom-up committees of 
popular power. Tamarrod could play an important role in this process, turning popular 
mobilisation into the organization of people’s power. Secondly, the current divide between pro-
Brotherhood and anti-Brotherhood protesters weakens the revolutionary movement. By 
distancing themselves from the generals as a ruling elite and from the opportunist opposition 
leaders, the Tamarrod revolutionaries could try to reach out to the Brotherhood rank-and-file – 
without creating any illusions in Morsi or the Ikhwan leadership. Thirdly, even though the 
military apparatus presented itself as an instrument of the revolution, it seeks to instrumentalise 
the revolution for its own purposes, much like the SCAF did in 2011. Revolutionaries should 
recognise that, whereas the common recruits, soldiers and lower officers might be their natural 
allies, the higher officers are part and parcel of the ruling bloc and will eventually turn against 
the revolutionary process to defend their political and economic privileges. This requires a 
careful campaign of solidarity with the army’s rank-and-file, in combination with a staunch 
criticism of the general staff. 
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